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LAND USE AND ZONING LAW: THE CURRENT LAY OF
THE LAND
Philip C. Strother *
Matthew R. Farley **
I. INTRODUCTION
Responsible land use and zoning are an integral part of every
locality's role in government. Throughout the twentieth century,
Virginia legislation made clear that zoning and other land use
controls are well within the police power of local government.
Each Virginia locality has a comprehensive plan: a blueprint that
guides the course of development., Development rights in each lo-
cality are determined by local zoning and subdivision ordinances. 2
Each locality also has administrative boards-Boards of Supervi-
sors ("BOS"), Boards of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"), and planning
commissions-to resolve planning and zoning disputes.3 All of
these structures are necessarily idiosyncratic, and each locality
has the power to guide planning within its own borders.
However, the General Assembly controls the authority original-
ly granted to localities, directly managing the scope of counties'
reach and modifying the power granted to cities by altering their
charters.4 Further, Virginia follows Dillon's Rule, which forbids
local government from imposing stricter limitations on develop-
ment than the General Assembly has authorized in the Virginia
* Founding Partner, Strother Law Offices, PLC, Richmond, Virginia. LL.M., 1999,
George Washington University Law School; J.D., 1997, Thomas M. Cooley Law School;
B.S., 1991, The Love School of Business, Elon University.
** 2010 J.D. Candidate, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
2. See id. §§ 15.2-2283 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (zoning); id. § 15.2-2240 (Repl. Vol. 2008)
(subdividing).
3. For example, the General Assembly has authorized the creation of BZAs to review
actions taken pursuant to a zoning ordinance, including variance and special exception
appeals. See id. § 15.2-2309 (Supp. 2009).
4. See id. §§ 15.2-900 to 15.2-976, 15.2-1100 to 15.2-1133, 15.2-1200 to 15.2-1249
(Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
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Code. 5 Both of these factors contribute to the complex nature of
land use, zoning, and planning in Virginia.
Not since its twenty-fifth volume has the Annual Survey of
Virginia Law featured a separate article on land use and zoning.6
Instead, this topic has been covered by articles on real estate law,
and, to a degree, civil practice and procedure. The Annual Sur-
vey's coverage of land use and zoning decisions, then, has been
understandably spotty and fragmented. As such, this article will
discuss select judicial decisions from the past three years, not
simply 2009. In addition, this article will survey recent legislation
in the realm of land use and zoning.
II. COURT DECISIONS
A. Construction and Interpretation of Ordinances and Statutes
Like any other area of law, a primary function of the judiciary
in land use, planning, and zoning proceedings is to interpret what
the legislature meant in enacting a particular code provision.
Questions of interpretation may find their way into circuit courts 7
and higher courts regularly, but those courts tend to give a great
deal of deference to administrative interpretation by the local
zoning administrator and local governing bodies.8 The reason for
such deference is that "[zioning administrators and boards of zon-
ing appeals ... are able to ensure consistent application conso-
nant with a local government's intent for specific ordinances.
Such agencies develop expertise in the relationship between par-
ticular textual language and a local government's overall zoning
plan."9
5. See Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711, 714, 25 S.E. 1001, 1002 (1896) ("[A locali-
ty] possesses no powers except those conferred upon it, expressly or by fair implication, by
the law which created it and other statutes applicable to it, and such other powers as are
essential to the attainment and maintenance of its declared objects and purposes. It can
do no act, nor make any contract, nor incur any liability, that is not thus authorized.").
6. See Woodrow W. Turner, Jr. & Mark R. Herring, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Planning, Zoning and Subdivision Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 841 (1991).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
8. See, e.g., Trs. of the Christ & St. Luke's Episcopal Church v. Bd. of Zoning Ap-
peals, 273 Va. 375, 381, 641 S.E.2d 104, 107 (2007).
9. Id. at 382, 641 S.E.2d at 107 (alteration in original) (quoting Lamar Co. v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 270 Va. 540, 547, 620 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2005)).
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1. Trustees of the Christ and St. Luke's
In Trustees of the Christ and St. Luke's Episcopal Church v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, a church administration sought inter-
pretation of the word "adjacent" in a Norfolk ordinance.1 Church
trustees owned two parcels of land separated by a fifty-foot wide
avenue." Both parcels were situated in an area zoned "HC-G2,"
one of the historical conservation districts in the area. 2 One re-
striction on property zoned HC-G2 prohibits a building from oc-
cupying more than fifty-five percent of the lot on which it is si-
tuated.13 The church sanctuary was located on one of the church
parcels, and it constituted a legal "nonconforming structure."4
The church planned to expand the sanctuary, but it could only do
so if the expansion did not create additional nonconformity with
the "fifty-five percent rule.""5 The only way the church could ex-
pand the sanctuary legally was if the two parcels, separated by a
public road, were considered a single lot, as the expansion would
cover only 54.98% of the combined lot area.1 6
To obtain this result, the church trustees sought an interpreta-
tion of the term "adjacent" as it appears in section 2-3 of the Nor-
folk Zoning Ordinance 17 from the zoning administrator of the City
of Norfolk.'8 The zoning administrator concluded that the term
adjacent means "next to" and not "across the street from." 9 On
appeal, the BZA agreed, and stated "that when two pieces of
property are separated by a fifty-foot public street, they are not
adjacent for purposes of defining zoning lots." 0 The trustees filed
10. Id. at 377-78, 641 S.E.2d at 105.
11. Id. at 378, 641 S.E.2d at 105.
12. Id.
13. NORFOLK, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9-1.9 (Supp. 2009).
14. Trs. of the Christ, 273 Va. at 378-79, 641 S.E.2d at 105-06.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 379, 641, S.E.2d at 106.
17. "For zoning purposes a lot or zoning lot is a piece of land identified on a plat of
record or in a deed of record and of sufficient area and dimensions to meet district re-
quirements . . . ." A lot may consist of "[clombinations of adjoining individual parcels
and/or portions of such parcels .... " NORFOLK, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 2-3 (Supp.
2009).
18. Trs. Of the Christ, 273 Va. at 379, 641 S.E.2d at 106.
19. Id. at 379-80, 641 S.E.2d at 106.
20. Id. at 380, 641 S.E.2d at 106.
2009]
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a petition with the circuit court, which affirmed with both the
zoning administrator and the BZA.21
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed all lower deci-
sions, stating that "deciding when two objects are not widely se-
parated, but are close enough to be adjacent requires a 'judgment
call.'22 In the court's view, that determination is best left to the
zoning administrator and the BZA, and those entities found that
the spirit and purpose of the city ordinance would be disserved by
the opposite interpretation.23 Quoting the zoning administrator,
the court said: "It would work against [the spirit and purpose of
the zoning requirements] to permit buildings located on one side
of a street to cover nearly 100% of a parcel in those situations
where the owner happens to own a vacant or nearly vacant parcel
across the street."24 Thus, the court interpreted the word "adja-
cent" in harmony with the purpose and intent of the underlying
ordinance, and it indicated that similar interpretative methodolo-
gy will be employed in the future.25
2. Lovelace v. Orange County BZA
In Lovelace v. Orange County Board of Zoning Appeals, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that a plat restricting a "reserved
area" does not prohibit construction and recordation of a resi-
dence where no covenant was previously filed.26 The controversy
arose when the Lovelaces purchased a 106-acre parcel, which was
part of a previous subdivision, described as "remaining land" on
the subdivision plat filed with the county.27 Elsewhere on that
plat was the explanation that the "[rieserved area as shown here-
on is intended as open space ... and is not to be further devel-
oped or subdivided."" When the Lovelaces applied for a zoning
permit to commence construction on a residential home, it was
denied by the zoning administrator. 29 The administrator con-
21. Trs. of the Christ & St. Luke's Episcopal Church v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 69 Va.
Cir. 457, 459 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Norfolk City).
22. Trs. of the Christ, 273 Va. at 381, 641 S.E.2d at 107.
23. Id. at 382, 641 S.E.2d at 107-08.
24. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 108.
25. See id. at 383, 641 S.E.2d at 108.
26. 276 Va. 155, 160, 661 S.E.2d 831, 833-34 (2008).
27. Id. at 157, 661 S.E.2d at 832.
28. Id,
29. Id.
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tended that development could not be approved because an
Orange County ordinance prohibits the approval of plats that
would violate the terms or intent of preserving reserved areas. 0
The ordinance allows certain parcels to be reserved for exclusive
agricultural use upon the filing of a declaration of covenant with
the clerk of the court1.3 The BZA affirmed on appeal, as did the
circuit court.3 2
In reversing both the BZA and the circuit court, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that failure to record a declaration of cove-
nant combined with the ambiguous language on the subdivision
plat itself meant that the use of the Lovelaces' parcel was unre-
stricted.3 3 The court focused on the lack of proper recordation un-
der the ordinance, and how that lack deprived the Lovelaces of
notice of restriction on development.l Since restrictions on the
free use of land are disfavored, the court held that the require-
ments to restrict land usage would be strictly construed and the
burden would be placed on the party seeking to enforce restric-
tions.35
3. Renkey v. County Board
In Renkey v. County Board, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
cided that provisions of the Arlington County Zoning Ordinance
were operative language and not part of a preamble, as the circuit
court had held.3 6 In Renkey, Arlington County approved a rezon-
ing from "R-5 one-family, restricted" to "commercial redevelop-
ment" without first zoning the area "general commercial," as re-
quired by ordinance.37 Residents opposed to the rezoning
challenged the county's actions on that basis.3 8 The county argued
that the ordinance language on which the residents relied was
merely a preamble and had no binding effect on the county's
30. Id.
31. ORANGE COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 70-734(a) (Supp. 2008).
32. Lovelace, 276 Va. at 157-58, 661 S.E.2d at 832.
33. Id. at 158, 661 S.E.2d at 833.
34. See id. at 159, 661 S.E.2d at 833.
35. Id. (quoting Waynesboro Vill., L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 80, 496 S.E.2d
64, 67 (1998)).
36. 272 Va. 369, 370, 634 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2006).
37. See id. at 372, 634 S.E.2d at 354.
38. Id.
2009]
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agents. 9 The circuit court agreed, and the residents appealed to
the supreme court.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. It held that the plain
language of the statute indicates that it is not a preamble because
only the initial portion of the paragraph states the purpose of the
zoning classification. 40 The remainder of the paragraph set out
"mandatory, eligibility criteria for the ... classification."'4 The
court concluded that "[in clear, unambiguous language, [the or-
dinance] requires that a site first be zoned [general commercial]
before it can be rezoned [commercial redevelopment], so it serves
a gate-keeping function," not just a purpose- or intent-stating
function.42
B. Administration and Enforcement
1. Scope of Zoning Authority
In Board of Supervisors v. Town of Purcellville, county and
town officials disagreed about which entity had zoning authority
over a jointly managed growth area.43 Relying on Dillon's Rule,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court and held
that the county retained zoning authority over all property not
annexed to the town. 4
Years before the controversy, the Town of Purcellville and Lou-
doun County entered an annexation agreement, whereby the
town received the right to annex areas within a specified area in
exchange for relinquishing its right to seek independent city sta-
tus. 45 The annexation agreement provided a joint comprehensive
plan to direct development of the specified area, and both locali-
ties agreed that the joint plan would be supreme within the speci-
fied annexation area.46 The joint plan contained preferred loca-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 375, 634 S.E.2d 356.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 276 Va. 419, 425, 427, 666 S.E.2d 512, 514, 515 (2008).
44. Id. at 437-38, 440, 666 S.E.2d at 520-22.
45. Id. at 425, 666 S.E.2d 514.
46. Id. at 425-26, 666 S.E.2d at 514. The joint comprehensive plan was implemented
as an aspect of both the town's comprehensive plan and the county's. Id. at 426, 666
S.E.2d at 514.
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tions for middle and high schools, but subdivisions were devel-
oped over those preferred locations.41 In response to the continued
demand for schools, the county purchased a tract of land some
two miles from the originally proposed location, intending to build
a high school. 48
Soon thereafter, the county convened to determine whether it
needed to seek a commission permit before commencing construc-
tion,49 and if so, whether it needed to confer with the town on the
matter. 0 The county resolved that it did not need to seek a com-
mission permit, and it could act on its own.5 1 The town challenged
both determinations in a multitude of forums, finally culminating
with a consolidated hearing of all challenges in circuit court.52 The
circuit court held that the town had joint and concurrent authori-
ty to review and approve the location of new development within
the specified annexation area. 53
The supreme court began its analysis forcefully: "A municipal
corporation is a mere local agency of the State and has no powers
beyond the corporate limits except such as are clearly and unmis-
takably delegated by the legislature.5 4 The court distinguished
between the joint planning authority of town and the singular
zoning authority of the county within the specified annexation
area. 5 Relying on Virginia Code sections 15.2-2232(A) and 15.2-
2223, the court established that the legislature granted zoning
authority to each locality only for "development of the territory
within its jurisdiction."5 6 Finding that the county retains jurisdic-
47. Id. at 426-47, 666 S.E.2d at 515.
48. Id. at 427, 666 S.E.2d at 515.
49. Id. "If a proposed development is not already a feature shown on the [comprehen-
sive] plan, then the proposal must be 'submitted to and approved by the [zoning] commis-
sion as being substantially in accord with the adopted comprehensive plan.'" Id. at 426,
666 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2232(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008)). Both the town
and the county refer to this subsequent approval process as a "commission permit." Id.
50. Id. at 427-28, 666 S.E.2d at 515-16.
51. Id.
52. The town filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court, and then appealed
the county zoning administrator's determination to the county BZA. Similarly, the county
appealed a determination by the town zoning administrator that both localities needed to
seek commission permits for the school to the town BZA. Id. at 427-33, 666 S.E.2d at 515-
18.
53. Id. at 432-33, 666 S.E.2d at 518.
54. Id. at 437, 666 S.E.2d at 521 (quoting City of Richmond v. Bd. of Supervisors, 199
Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1958)).
55. Id. at 438, 666 S.E.2d at 521.
56. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
2009]
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tion for all parts of the specified annexation area until the land is
actually annexed by the town, the court held that the county had
sole zoning authority to advance the school construction.57 The
court set out one caveat: the county still had to apply for a com-
mission permit from its own zoning administrator because the
proposed construction site was over two miles from the site pro-
posed in the original joint comprehensive plan.58 That distance,
the court held, was too great for the site to be in the "general or
approximate location" of the proposed site in the comprehensive
plan, as required by Virginia Code section 15.2-2232.19
2. BZA Powers
Boards of zoning appeals are "creatures of statute possessing
only those powers expressly conferred."60 This principle was
tested in Board of Zoning Appeals v. Board of Supervisors.61 In
BZA v. BOS, the Fairfax County BZA brought a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration that the BZA was entitled
to have the BOS pay litigation expenses in the defense of all cer-
tiorari proceedings against it.62 In response, the BOS argued that
since no statute gave the BZA the power to initiate suit against
the BOS or any other entity, the declaratory judgment action
must be dismissed.63 Citing Dillon's Rule, the Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed.64 The court outright rejected the BZA's argument
that it had the ability to sue on its own behalf because it was "ne-
cessary and essential to enable the BZA to exercise the powers
expressly granted it. ' '65 Instead, the powers of the BZA are strictly
limited to those expressly granted it, and do not include auxiliary
powers the BZA perceives as necessary to effect those express
powers.
66
57. See id.
58. Id. at 440-41, 666 S.E.2d at 523.
59. Id. at 441, 666 S.E.2d at 523.
60. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Cedar Knoll, Inc., 217 Va. 740, 743, 232 S.E.2d 767, 769
(1977); Lake George Corp. v. Standing, 211 Va. 733, 735, 180 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1971).
61. 276 Va. 550, 666 S.E.2d 315 (2008).
62. Id. at 552, 666 S.E.2d at 316. The BOS had previously stated that it would no
longer permit the county attorney to represent the BZA, and it would no longer pay for
private legal counsel. Id. at 551-52, 666 S.E.2d at 315-16.
63. Id. at 552, 666 S.E.2d at 316.
64. See id. at 553-54, 666 S.E.2d at 316-17.
65. Id. at 553, 666 S.E.2d at 316.
66. See id. at 554, 666 S.E.2d at 317.
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3. Vested Rights
In Alexandria City Council v. Mirant Potomac River, LLC, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that certain zoning amendments
impaired the vested rights of a coal-fueled power plant owner and
were therefore invalid. 67 Mirant was the current owner and opera-
tor of a power plant, which had been located in the city of Alex-
andria since 1949, for which two special use permits ("SUPs") had
previously been granted for building additions.6 8 Throughout the
1990s, the city approved residential and commercial construction
in the vicinity of the plant, and, unsurprisingly, two private resi-
dents complained to the city about possible health effects from
the plant's emissions in 2003.69 After further investigation, the
city council determined that the plant's operations were not com-
patible with the city's long-term plan, and it resolved to shut the
plant down.70 To accomplish these goals, the city adopted an
amendment to its zoning ordinance, which would change the
plant's designation to nonconforming use, subject to abatementl7
The city also revoked the two SUPs based on alleged emissions
law violations.7 2
The circuit court held that the ordinance amendment was
invalid because it violated the vested rights statute, and it invali-
dated the SUP revocations, holding that such action required a
"nexus between the 'violation of law' relied upon and the subject
matter of the permits in issue."73 On the vested rights argument,
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that because the
amendment requires Mirant to cease operations and because
seeking a comprehensive SUP to address its new nonconforming
use would be futile, the amendment violated the vested right of
the plant owner and was invalid. 74 The court then went on to ad-
dress the revocation of Mirant's two previous SUPs. The relevant
ordinance allowed revocation or suspension of SUPs "upon proof
67. 273 Va. 448, 453-55, 643 S.E.2d 203, 206-07 (2007).
68. Id. at 451, 643 S.E.2d at 204-05.
69. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 205.
70. Id. at 451-52, 643 S.E.2d at 205.
71. Id. at 452-53, 643 S.E.2d at 205-06.
72. Id. at 452, 643 S.E.2d at 205.
73. Id. at 453, 643 S.E.2d at 206.
74. Id. at 454-55, 643 S.E.2d at 207 ("[Tlermination of the use allowed by virtue of an
established vested right impairs the vested right and therefore violates Code § 15.2-
2307.").
20091
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that the holder ... failed to comply with any law, including, with-
out limitation, the conditions subject to which the special use
permit was granted.""5 The city argued that the ordinance should
be given its plain meaning-that is, the phrase "any law" should
be interpreted literally, allowing SUP revocation for traffic or tax
laws completely unrelated to land use.16 The court declined to fol-
low such a bizarre interpretation, instead upholding the circuit
court's imposition of a "nexus between the law violated and the
purpose of the SUP.""7
In Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia considered two consolidated appeals of a determination of
the BZA in Blacksburg and subsequent affirmance of that deter-
mination by the Montgomery County Circuit Court. 78 One of the
two appeals was filed by the Town of Blacksburg itself; the second
was filed by a group of private citizens residing in immediate
proximity to the property affected by the determination. 79 The
property at issue consisted of a 39.63 acre parcel located in the
center of the town. 0 In 2006, a group of developers who had ac-
quired the land applied to the town for rezoning of a portion of
the parcel to General Commercial from its previous Low-Density
Residential zoning classification.81 In connection with the pro-
posed rezoning, the developers submitted proffers that restricted
certain features of the property's development in exchange for a
conditional rezoning to General Commercial.8 2 Introductory lan-
guage to the proffers and the developers' application for rezoning
described an appealing mixed-use development with commercial,
residential, and recreational applications, occupying a "pede-
strian-friendly, tree-lined boulevard" to create "a cohesive devel-
opment that provides a distinctive appearance and true sense of
75. ALEXANDRIA, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 11-506(A) (Supp. 2008).
76. Mirant, 273 Va. at 456, 643 S.E.2d at 207.
77. Id. at 456-57, 643 S.E.2d at 207-08.
78. 277 Va. 250, 256-57, 673 S.E.2d 170, 172 (2009).
79. Id. at 265, 673 S.E.2d at 177.
80. Id. at 257, 673 S.E.2d at 172.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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space." 3 The proffers were accompanied by a "preferred illustra-
tive plan" with conceptual drawings consistent with this descrip-
tion.8
The proffers themselves placed limitations on building heights,
setbacks, and buffer zones, thereby defining a "buildable
envelope" for the property., The proffers also encompassed the
construction of a multi-use path along one border of the proper-
ty and limited the number of residential units to an amount be-
low that which would otherwise be allowed in a general commer-
cial district.8 6 The proffers did not, however, specify or limit the
use or uses to which the property could be put. 7 The town ap-
proved the application for rezoning on May 9, 2006, incorporating
the developers' proffers and application into the ordinance rezon-
ing the property, Ordinance 1412.8
After the passage of the ordinance rezoning the property,
the developers began submitting preliminary plans to the town
zoning administrator for review to determine compliance with the
proffers. 9 None of the draft plans submitted, including the formal
preliminary site plans, conformed completely to the proffers, and
the zoning administrator notified the developers of the deficien-
cies. 0 Moreover, while the plans continued to evolve, the propos-
als began to feature a single structure of 176,000 square feet in
size.91 As the Blacksburg community began to express concerns
with regard to the construction of such a structure in the midst of
downtown, the town passed a new ordinance-Ordinance 1450-
that created a new use category of "Retail Sales, Large Format."9 2
The ordinance required a special use permit for the construction
of any retail sales use in excess of 80,000 square feet. 93 After Or-
dinance 1450 passed on May 29, 2007, the developers sought a
determination from the zoning administrator that their rights to
develop a large-format retail use was not affected by the new or-
83. Id. at 258, 673 S.E.2d at 173.
84. Id. at 259, 673 S.E.2d at 173.
85. Id. at 273, 673 S.E.2d at 181.
86. Id. at 258-59, 673 S.E.2d at 172-73.
87. Id. at 259, 673 S.E.2d at 173.
88. See id. at 260, 673 S.E.2d at 173.
89. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 174.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 260-61, 673 S.E.2d at 174.
92. Id. at 261, 263, 673 S.E.2d at 174-76.
93. Id. at 261-63, 673 S.E.2d at 175-76.
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dinance, claiming that two Virginia statutes-sections 15.2-2307
and 15.2-2298(b) of the Virginia Code-gave the developers
vested rights to develop such a use.94 The town zoning adminis-
trator disagreed and determined that the developers were subject
to the requirements of Ordinance 145 0. 95
The developers appealed the zoning administrator's determina-
tion to the BZA, which conducted public hearings and ultimately
determined unanimously that the developers had a vested right
to develop the property for retail sales as that term was defined
prior to the passage of Ordinance 1450.96 In response, the town
council and a group of private citizens filed separate petitions for
a writ of certiorari in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to
challenge the BZA's determination that Ordinance 1450 did not
apply to the developers. 97 In response to the petitions, the devel-
opers again claimed that sections 15.2-2307 and 15.2-2298(B)
vested their right to develop the property, notwithstanding Or-
dinance 1450. 98 The developers argued that the approved proffers
"speciflied] use," and that the property was rezoned for a specific
use or density, both triggering application of section 15.2-2307. 91
They further argued that the proffered conditions for construction
of a multi-use path and a $25,000 payment for traffic calming
measures triggered application of section 15.2-2298(B) as dedica-
tions of "'real property of substantial value"' and "'substantial
cash payment[ I for... substantial public improvements.'100 Nei-
ther condition, they claimed, was necessitated by the rezoning it-
self. 0'
After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order finding that
section 15.2-2307 vested the developers' rights and exempted the
property from application of Ordinance 1450.102 The trial court
made no findings with regard to Section 15.2-2298(B), finding on-
ly that the conditional rezoning of the property on May 9, 2006,
94. Id. at 262, 264, 673 S.E.2d at 175-76.
95. Id. at 263, 673 S.E.2d at 176.
96. Id. at 264-65, 673 S.E.2d at 176-77.
97. Id. at 265, 673 S.E.2d at 177.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 266, 673 S.E.2d at 177 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2298(B) (Repl. Vol.
2008)).
101. Id. at 266, 673 S.E.2d at 177.
102. Id. at 267, 673 S.E.2d at 178.
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constituted a significant affirmative governmental act as defined
by Section 15.2-2307.103
Both the town and the private citizens appealed the decision of
the trial court to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which consoli-
dated the appeals.10 The court, reviewing the trial court's legal
conclusions de novo, unanimously found that the trial court had
erred in determining that the conditional rezoning constituted a
significant affirmative governmental act."°5 The court reiterated
that no landowner has the right to expect that the current zoning
classification of his land will continue and noted that the excep-
tion to this general rule-vesting-is narrow.1 6 The court rejected
the developers' argument that the design features in the proffers,
such as reduced building height and increased setbacks, specified
use as required to trigger section 15.2-2307.107 In seeking flexibili-
ty to develop the property, the developers proffered conditions
that did not specify use.108 The proffered residential density limi-
tation was related to the "overall scheme of the project," and did
not vest in the developers the right to unrestricted, commercial
development. 1°9 Further, the court concluded that section 15.2-
2298(B) was not triggered, as neither the proffered multi-use
path nor the $25,000 payment met the requirements of that sta-
tute.11 Accordingly, the court entered final judgment for the town
and the private citizens and reinstated the determination of the
town zoning administrator."'
The Hale case stands firmly for the proposition that specificity
of use is required during the land use application process if a
property owner seeks the safe harbor protections of the vested
rights exception to the general rule that one does not have a right
to expect that the current zoning classification of his land will
continue.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 268, 673 S.E.2d at 178.
105. See id. at 268, 279, 673 S.E.2d at 179, 185.
106. Id. at 271, 673 S.E.2d at 180.
107. Id. at 274, 673 S.E.2d at 182.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 275-76, 673 S.E.2d at 183.
110. Id. at 278, 673 S.E.2d at 184.
111. Id. at 279, 673 S.E.2d at 185.
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4. Initiating Zoning Amendments
In Ace Temporaries, Inc. v. City Council, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a zoning ordinance amendment does not need
to be in writing when adopted, but such amendments most strict-
ly adhere to the procedural requirements enumerated in the Vir-
ginia Code. 112 Ace Temporaries ("Ace") operated a day labor agen-
cy in Alexandria when the city's Planning Commission approved
a zoning amendment that included an eighteen-month abatement
period for nonconforming day labor agencies.13 The zoning ordin-
ance amendment was well accepted by the city council; it recom-
mended further amendment to reduce the abatement period from
eighteen to twelve months."1 4 Intending to pass the twelve-month
abatement version of the zoning amendment, the city council in-
stead passed the eighteen-month abatement version." 5 To correct
its mistake, the city council passed a second amendment that
would reduce the abatement period to twelve months."' Ace was
subsequently notified that its agency was considered a noncon-
forming use and was required to cease operations within twelve
months. "'
In response, Ace alleged (1) that the original zoning ordinance
amendment was invalid because it was not in written form when
the planning commission passed it and (2) that the second, ab-
atement-shortening amendment was invalid because it was not
initiated by motion or resolution as required by law."" In dismiss-
ing the petitioner's first argument, the court quoted Virginia
Code section 15.2-2286(A)(7) 119 and stated that because the legis-
lature did not include a "written form" requirement, it would not
impose one. 120 Regarding the second argument, the court sided
with the petitioner and held the amendment invalid for lack of
112. 274 Va. 461, 466-68, 649 S.E.2d 688, 690-91 (2007).
113. Id. at 463, 649 S.E.2d at 689.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 464, 649 S.E.2d at 689.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 465, 649 S.E.2d at 690.
119. Section 15.2-2286(A)(7) governs when and how "a governing body may by ordin-
ance amend, supplement, or change the regulations, district boundaries, or classifications
of property." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2286(A)(7) (Supp. 2009).
120. Ace Temporaries, 274 Va. at 466, 649 S.E.2d at 690 ("'Courts cannot add language
to the statute the General Assembly has not seen fit to include." (quoting Janvier v. Ar-
minio, 272 Va. 353, 366, 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006))).
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proper initiation.121 It stated: "Code § 15.2-2286(A)(7) requires
that each time an amendment to the Zoning Ordinance is made,
the amendment must be properly initiated [by motion or resolu-
tion] .,122 As such, the procedural requirements of the abatement-
shortening amendment were insufficient, 12 3 and Ace would be giv-
en an additional six months before its forced cessation.
5. Challenged Rezoning
In Board of Supervisors v. Greengael, L.L.C., the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a BOS can rezone property from resi-
dential to light industrial even if a developer has a vested right to
develop his proposed subdivision. 124 The developer in this case,
Greengael, bought an approximately ninety-six acre parcel zoned
residential.2 5 The property was located just outside the Culpeper
town limits, and Greengael ran into problems securing approval
from town water and sewer systems to proceed with the subdivi-
sion and development. 126 Nearly one year later, the county denied
Greengael's subdivision efforts and rezoned the area to light in-
dustrial. 27 Soon thereafter, Greengael filed suit against the coun-
ty BOS, the county water and sewer authority, the county plan-
ning commission, and the town council. 128 The circuit court held
that the subdivision plat should be approved and invalidated the
rezoning because Greengael had a vested right to develop the
property under the old, residential zoning classification, and the
BOS appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 12 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. 30 It held
that the BOS had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner in denying the subdivision application, noting that Greengael
had failed to secure the requisite approval letter from the water
and sewage authority. 13 Instead of focusing on the "bureaucratic
121. Id. at 467, 649 S.E.2d at 691.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 271 Va. 266, 282, 626 S.E.2d 357, 366 (2006).
125. Id. at 271-72, 626 S.E.2d at 360.
126. Id. at 272-74, 626 S.E.2d at 360-61.
127. Id. at 275, 626 S.E.2d 361-62.
128. Id. at 275, 626 S.E.2d at 362.
129. Id. at 276-77, 626 S.E.2d at 362-63.
130. Id. at 288, 626 S.E.2d at 369.
131. Id. at 278, 626 S.E.2d at 363-64.
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nightmare" of seeking approval from the town and county as the
circuit court had,'32 the supreme court relied on the strict inter-
pretation given procedural requirements in the zoning ordin-
ances. 3 3 "Because Greengael's application did not contain the util-
ity letter required for approval of a preliminary subdivision
application, the Board acted in compliance with the applicable
subdivision ordinance in denying approval, and its decision was
not arbitrary and capricious.1114
Likewise, on the rezoning challenge, the supreme court re-
versed. It held that Greengael had no vested right since there was
no affirmative governmental act allowing the development to pro-
ceed.115 In particular the court held that (1) because it had re-
versed the lower court's subdivision approval, that order could
not qualify as a sufficient affirmative act and (2) because the gen-
eral rezoning was not enacted at Greengaers request or specifical-
ly directed at its project, that could not qualify as a significant
government act either.136 Finally, the court noted that, even if
Greengael had a vested right, it would only enable the company
to continue with this project, not challenge the rezoning ordin-
ance in its entirety. 37 The case was further litigated in federal
court, and the county BOS prevailed there as well.138
6. Contempt Order
In Mitchell L. Phelps, Inc. v. Board of County Supervisors, the
trial court ordered a junkyard owner to comply with various
county code provisions, including the creation of a twenty-foot
setback of all property uses and buildings from property lines, the
erection of a solid fence around the setback area, and planting
two rows of evergreens in the setback area. 139 He was given ninety
132. In fact, the circuit court suspected some collusion between the town and the coun-
ty to procedurally default Greengael's subdivision. See id. at 276, 626 S.E.2d at 362-63.
133. Id. at 281, 626 S.E.2d at 365.
134. Id. at 282, 626 S.E.2d at 366.
135. Id. at 283-84, 626 S.E.2d at 366-67 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Repl. Vol.
2003)).
136. Id. at 283, 626 S.E.2d at 366-67.
137. Id. at 282-83, 626 S.E.2d at 366.
138. See Greengael, LC v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 07-1878, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
19218, at *7, *9 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (dismissing
federal constitutional claims and Fair Housing Act claims as barred by res judicata).
139. No. 1785-06-4, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 262, at *2-3 (Va. Ct. App. July 3, 2007).
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days to comply with those provisions, but failed to do S0.140 Find-
ing the junkyard owner in contempt of its prior order, the trial
court allowed the county to enter the junkyard to remove all un-
permitted structures, create the required setback, construct a
fence, and plant a double-staggered row of evergreens.' 4 ' The
court's contempt order mirrored the requirements in Prince Wil-
liam County Code section 32-601.50, except that the order re-
quired the evergreens be planted a maximum of fifteen feet apart,
where the code required a minimum of fifteen feet between
plants. " 2 The junkyard owner challenged this departure from the
ordinance language to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, contend-
ing that such departure required reversal.1 3 The court of appeals
disagreed and noted that the trial court was "free to [so depart] as
a part of its inherent power to fashion an appropriate punish-
ment."'- The court also held that the county would be indemni-
fied for its work to enforce the court's order on the junkyard own-
er's property. 4 5
C. Review & Procedural Issues
1. Sufficiency of Public Notice
Compliance with general notice requirements is an indispensi-
ble precursor to most land use actions, including variance appli-
cations and appeals to the local BZA. 4 6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia has previously held that published notice of a zoning or-
dinance amendment must include a "descriptive summary" that
covers the main points of the amendment concisely. 47 A similar
standard applies to proposed plans and ordinances, amendments
to the same, proposed comprehensive plans, and special exception
applications. 4 8 Generally speaking, notice of public hearings must
be advertised in a local newspaper once a week for two successive
140. Id. at *3.
141. Id. at *3-4.
142. See id. at *2-4; see also PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 32-
601.50 (Supp. 2009).
143. Mitchell L. Phelps, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 262, at *5.
144. Id. at *6.
145. Id. at *8.
146. See VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 15.2-2204 to 15.2-2205 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
147. Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554-55, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003).
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(A), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
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weeks and must specify the time and place of public hearing on
the matter.149
In Rohr v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors, a landowner
sought invalidation of a previously approved special exception
permit.15 ° The special exception in question was earlier approved
by the Fauquier County BOS, authorizing the construction of a
large shopping center with accompanying signage."5 The develop-
er, Cross Creek Investments, LLC, planned to allot over half of
the shopping center to construction of a Costco Store building,
characterized as a "big box" store in the pleadings. 152 The plaintiff
owned nearly seven acres of improved real estate approximately
two thousand feet from the Cross Creek project. 153 In challenging
the special exception granted by the Fauquier County BOS, the
plaintiff alleged that the exception was inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan and that notice was inaccurate, defective,
and failed to give a sufficiently descriptive summary as required
by statute.14
The developer had, in fact, advertised notices in the Fauquier
Times-Democrat, but one of the parcel identification numbers
("PIN") contained a typographical error."5' The circuit court ad-
dressed two issues: first, whether the published notice contained
a sufficiently descriptive summary as a matter of law and second,
whether the typographical error rendered notice defective." 6 Cit-
ing Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors,,7 and Gas Mart Corp. v.
Board of Supervisors,18 the court stated "a descriptive summary
must 'cover the main points concisely, but without detailed ex-
planation, in a manner that serves to describe [a parcel] for the
knowledge and understanding of others.' 15 9 The court restated
the test it would use as whether "the average citizen could ...
reasonably determine from reading the ad whether he or she was
149. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2204(A).
150. 75 Va. Cir. 167, 167-68 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Fauquier County).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 168.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 169-70, 172.
156. Id. at 170-72.
157. 266 Va. 550, 587 S.E.2d 589 (2003).
158. 269 Va. 334, 611 S.E.2d 340 (2005).
159. Rohr, 75 Va. Cir. at 170 (quoting Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554-55, 587 S.E.2d at
591).
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affected by the proposed [action] based upon the description pro-
vided."160 The court applied these principles and held that, while
the exact size or breakdown of the shopping center was not speci-
fied in the notice, the advertisement was not insufficient as a
matter of law.16' It explained that because the ad described (1) the
action to be taken by the BOS-the special exception application;
(2) the subject of the actions-construction of a shopping center;
and (3) the location of the actions-specified by the PINs, it was
sufficient to satisfy the statutory notice requirements.'6 2 The court
only briefly addressed the typographical error, holding that even
with the error, a citizen of Fauquier County could reasonably de-
termine if he or she was affected by the proposed action. '63 The
court added that, while a typographical error could conceivably
cause enough genuine confusion to render notice defective, the er-
ror in this case was not serious enough to cause confusion.164
In an older case, Northern Virginia Community Hospital v.
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, Judge Home found pub-
lished notice adequate for similar reasons.' 65 In Northern Virginia
Community Hospital, a health care provider sought to construct a
hospital on land for which hospitals were a permitted use with
special exception from the local BOS. 166 The provider sought spe-
cial exception to proceed with construction, but the BOS denied
the application and amended the locality's comprehensive plan,
allegedly to restrict competition and protect a second health care
provider in the area. 67 The plaintiffs sought invalidation of the
comprehensive plan amendments, arguing that there was not
adequate published notice.' 68 In finding notice sufficient, the court
stated:
[Tihe notice adequately informed the public that the amendments
would address, among other things, the location and type of health
care facilities in the County. Simply stated, a resident of Loudoun
County interested in where health care facilities might be located in
160. Id. at 171 (citing Gas Mart Corp., 269 Va. at 347, 611 S.E.2d at 346).
161. Id. at 171-72.
162. Id. at 171.
163. Id. at 172.
164. Id.
165. See 72 Va. Cir. 174, 177 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Loudoun County).
166. See id. at 174.
167. Id. at 174-75.
168. Id. at 175.
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the County would need to look no further than the advertisement to
embolden their interest in the public debate on the issue.'69
2. Necessary Parties
As with any other litigation, certain parties are necessary to
land use actions, and a matter cannot proceed until the proper
parties are before the court.10 However, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has held that, in order to toll the thirty-day appeals pe-
riod, only the "local governing body" and the contesting party
need be named. 171 In order to adjudicate the matter, however, all
necessary parties must be joined or must intervene by their own
will. 172
In Miller v. Highland County, the Supreme Court of Virginia
revisited this principle and held that the appropriate "local go-
verning body" when contesting the decision of the local BOS is the
BOS, not the town, the county, or the planning commission. 173 The
Miller case arose when the Highland County BOS granted a con-
ditional use permit ("CUP") to allow construction of wind turbines
that exceeded the height restrictions in an agricultural district.'74
Nearby property owners challenged the CUP issuance, alleging
that the BOS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and
without proper authority. 75 However, in their complaints, the
nearby landowners named only "Highland County, Virginia," not
the Highland County BOS.176 On appeal, the locality argued that
the landowners' action was barred because they failed to name
the appropriate local governing body-the BOS-as a party to the
action within the thirty-day appeals period. 177
169. Id. at 177.
170. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009) (granting
right to seek review to those persons "jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the
board of zoning appeals, or any aggrieved taxpayer or any officer, department, board or
bureau of the locality").
171. See Friends of Clark Mountain Found., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Va. 16, 21,
406 S.E.2d 19, 21-22 (1991).
172. Id., 406 S.E.2d at 22.
173. See 274 Va. 355, 367, 650 S.E.2d 532, 537 (2007).
174. Id. at 361, 650 S.E.2d at 533-34.
175. Id. at 362, 650 S.E.2d at 534.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 363, 650 S.E.2d at 535 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2285(F) (Repl. Vol. 2003
& Cum. Supp. 2007)). Section 15.2-2285(F) requires that actions in circuit court contesting
the decisions of a local government body are filed within thirty days of the decision. VA.
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The court agreed and held that "[t]he complete absence of any
language in Virginia Code § 15.2-2285(F) referring to a 'locality'
indicates a legislative intent that only the 'governing body,' the
entity that rendered the contested decision, be a required party
defendant in an action challenging that decision."178 Because the
contested decision was issued by the local BOS, the statute re-
quired the BOS to be a named defendant within thirty days to toll
the appeals time limit. 9 Since the landowners had failed to name
the BOS, the court was required to dismiss the appeal. 180
The Miller holding was recently applied in Rohr v. Fauquier
County Board of Supervisors.181 In determining whether the coun-
ty was a proper party defendant, the court stated:
The recent case of Miller v. Highland County dealt directly with this
question, ruling that the Board of Supervisors as an entity and not
the County is the proper party Defendant in a declaratory judgment
action involving a zoning question. Applying Va. Code § 15.2-2285,
the Court held that the governing body, to wit the Board of Supervi-
sors is the "entity that rendered the contested decisions," and hence
the proper Defendant. Therefore, the demurrer of Fauquier County
will be sustained with prejudice and the case dismissed as to the
County.
18 2
3. Third-Party Standing
In order to maintain a land use action, a litigant must have
standing. This means that all parties must have "'such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure ... concrete
adverseness."' ' This "personal stake" has been generally reduced
to whether a party is "aggrieved" by a land use or zoning action.l 8
A series of recent decisions have affirmed that the term "ag-
grieved" is narrowly interpreted by Virginia courts. As these cas-
CODE. ANN. § 15.2-2285(F) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
178. Miller, 274 Va. at 365-66, 650 S.E.2d at 536.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 368, 650 S.E.2d at 537.
181. 75 Va. Cir. 167, 169 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Fauquier County). For the facts and back-
ground discussion of Rohr, see supra Part II.C.1.
182. Rohr, 75 Va. Cir. at 169 (internal citations omitted).
183. Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984) (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978)).
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009). Many local zoning
ordinances couch standing in the economic injury or other aggrieved status of a party. See,
e.g., LOUDOUN COUNTY, VA. ZONING ORDINANCE § 6-1909 (Supp. 2008).
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es illustrate, perhaps the most difficult issue regarding standing
in land use actions concerns the ability of adjacent property own-
ers to bring suit.
In Mann v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, the Loudoun
County Circuit Court held that an adjacent property owner had
standing to challenge a zoning decision under the county ordin-
ance so long as he could prove economic injury.185 In Mann, a farm
owner sought the opinion of the local zoning administrator to de-
termine if he needed a certificate of appropriateness ("COA")
prior to construction of two buildings in a historic district. 186 The
administrator was of the opinion that no COA was required under
the county ordinance, but the adjacent property owners appealed
the administrator's determination to the BOS, alleging that they
would suffer harm from the proposed construction.8 7 The BOS
agreed that no COA was required, and the adjacent landowner
appealed to circuit court.88 There, the BOS challenged the adja-
cent landowner's standing to pursue the appeal. 8 9
Faced with the issue of standing on appeal, the circuit court
noted that "[hiad the County elected to limit appeals to only af-
fected landowners within the historic district, they would have
said so rather than expand the limits of standing to include those
who are directly or economically aggrieved." 190 Because the issue
of standing was before the court on summary judgment, it de-
clined to dismiss on that basis, noting that to proceed, the lan-
downer would need to demonstrate economic injury in the fu-
ture.91
Less than one month later, the Mann decision was cited in
Owens v. City Council.'92 In Owens, the Christ and Saint Luke's
Episcopal Church, located in a historic district, was issued a COA
to construct a fifty-three foot tall addition. 93 A nearby landowner
in the historic district challenged the COA and the COA-granting
process, alleging, among other things, that she was deprived her
185. 75 Va. Cir. 24, 27 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Loudoun County).
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. at 24-25.
188. Id. at 25.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 26.
191. Id. at 27.
192. See 75 Va. Cir. 91, 106 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Norfolk City).
193. Id. at 92.
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constitutional right to be heard on the matter.9 4 The City retorted
that the landowner did not have standing to sue, and argued that,
pursuant to the city ordinance, only the COA applicant enjoys the
right to appeal an adverse decision.-'
The circuit court declined to dismiss the appeal for lack of
standing.9 ' It held that, because the landowner had spent well
over half a million dollars on improvements to her house and
since she adequately alleged "a genuine threat of economic harm
to her investment in her residence through damage to her neigh-
borhood's character as protected by zoning district regulations,"
she had standing to bring suit. 97
Finally, in Logan v. City Council, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia held that a private landowner does not have third-party stand-
ing to challenge actions taken in the application of subdivision
ordinances. 19 In Logan, landowners sought declaratory judgment
against the city council and planning commission, alleging that a
number of exceptions to the city's subdivision ordinance granted
by the subdivision agent would be unsafe and inappropriate. 9
The challenged exceptions included increased street grades and
reduced street widths to enable construction of an access road to
a future residential development.2 0°
Since there was no specific cause of action under the subdivi-
sion statutes or ordinances, the city argued that the landowners
had no right to challenge the subdivision ordinance as applied to
this particular project. 20 1 In response, the landowners asserted
that the Declaratory Judgment Act 20 1 permitted their challenge to
the particular application of the subdivision ordinance.203 The
court agreed with the city and stated that "strangers to the sub-
division approval process [ ] [do] not have a third-party right of ac-
tion to enforce the locality's application of its subdivision ordin-
194. Id. at 93. Anne Owens, the landowner, alleged that the COA process violated her
due process rights, both procedural and substantive, and her equal protection rights. Id.
195. Id. at 95; see NORFOLK, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9-0.4(m) (Supp. 2009).
196. Owens, 75 Va. Cir. at 99.
197. Id. at 97-98.
198. See 275 Va. 483, 498-99, 659 S.E.2d 296, 304-05 (2008).
199. Id. at 488-90, 659 S.E.2d at 298-99.
200. Id. at 489, 659 S.E.2d at 299.
201. Id. at 497-98, 659 S.E.2d at 303-04.
202. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-184 to 8.01-191 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
203. Logan, 275 Va. at 498, 659 S.E.2d at 304.
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ance in a declaratory judgment suit, because no statute grant[s]
third parties this right."2 °4 The court emphasized that, although
litigants had previously sought to challenge land use decisions us-
ing the Declaratory Judgment Act, it does "'not create or alter any
substantive rights, or bring any other additional rights into be-
ing.' 20 5 Thus, absent a specifically enumerated third-party right
of appeal in the Virginia Code, standing will not be found in like
cases.
It is important at this point to reconcile the seemingly adverse
outcomes of the above cases. Essential to the understanding that
these decisions are, indeed, compatible is the differentiation be-
tween third-party suits that seek judicial interpretation of a local
ordinance and those suits that seek judicial review of a locality's
application of its ordinance. 2°6 The former-suits seeking pure le-
gal interpretation of a statute or municipal ordinance-are fully
contemplated by the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act.2°7 The
latter are not, and the Supreme Court of Virginia has made clear,
especially with its Logan decision, that parties seeking additional
judicial review of specific land use actions must find a right of ac-
tion outside the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to have stand-
ing.20 8 Such right of action only exists regarding zoning deci-
sions.29 Therefore, currently, as-applied challenges to sub-
division approvals or planning decisions will lack standing.
204. Id. (citing Shilling v. Jiminez, 268 Va. 202, 208, 597 S.E.2d 206, 209-10 (2004)).
205. Id. at 499, 659 S.E.2d at 304 (quoting Miller v. Highland County, 274 Va. 355,
370, 650 S.E.2d 532, 539 (2007)).
206. See generally Robert Jackson Allen, Nothing in My Back Yard? The Case Against
Expanding Third-Party Rights to Challenge Local Land Use Decisions in Virginia, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 10110, 10113 (2009).
207. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009) ("Controver-
sies involving the interpretation of deeds, wills, and other instruments of writing, statutes,
municipal ordinances and other governmental regulations, may be [adjudicated by circuit
courts], and this enumeration does not exclude other instances of actual antagonistic as-
sertion and denial of right.").
208. Logan, 275 Va. at 499, 659 S.E.2d at 304-05 ('Because the declaratory judgment
statutes do not create [substantive] rights, and in the absence of statutory authority
granting ... a right of appeal to actions taken under the Subdivision Ordinance, Logan
remained a stranger to the subdivision approval process and was not authorized to chal-
lenge.., actions [taken] under that Ordinance.").
209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2311(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008) (granting a right of action to
appeal zoning decisions to the local BZA to "any person aggrieved."). No similar provisions
exist for planning or subdivision challenges.
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Applying this distinction to the cases discussed above, it would
seem that both Mann and Owens fall into the latter category, in
which a party is challenging the application of a municipal zoning
ordinance. However, statutory standing was found because the
plaintiffs had a right of action under Virginia Code section 15.2-
2285(F).210 Conversely, in Logan, the plaintiffs sought review of
the locality's application of a subdivision ordinance.1 In Logan,
the plaintiffs mistakenly relied on the Declaratory Judgment Act
for review of an "as applied" challenge to a subdivision approv-
al.212 Again, this is insufficient to sustain third-party standing in
an "as applied" subdivision or planning challenge.
4. Timeliness
The provisions of Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 govern ap-
peals from a BZA decision to circuit court. The statute states that
any person aggrieved by a BZA decision may file a petition speci-
fying grounds for appeal within thirty days of the BZA's final de-
cision.213 Until recently, it was unclear whether a violation of the
thirty-day time limitation could be raised post-circuit court dispo-
sition.
In Board of Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that the thirty-day filing require-
ment in Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 does not involve the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court to adjudicate the matter
in controversy, so a claim of procedural deficiency on that basis
cannot be raised on appeal. 21 4 The court stated that the thirty-day
filing requirement is an 'other "jurisdictional" element[ ]' subject
to waiver if not properly raised [in the circuit court]." " The court
clarified in a footnote:
The 30-day filing requirement could also be viewed as "notice juris-
diction, or effective notice to a party." The purpose of a time limita-
tion for filing an appeal "is not to penalize the appellant but to pro-
210. See id. § 15.2-2285(F) (Repl. Vol. 2008); Owens v. City Council, 75 Va. Cir. 91, 98-
99 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Norfolk City); Mann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Supervisors, 75 Va. Cir.
24, 26-27 (Cir. Ct. 2008) (Loudoun County).
211. Logan, 275 Va. at 489-90, 659 S.E.2d at 299.
212. Id. at 497-98, 659 S.E.2d at 303-04.
213. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
214. 271 Va. 336, 347-48, 626 S.E.2d 374, 381 (2006).
215. Id. at 347, 626 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387
S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990)).
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tect the appellee. If the required papers are not [timely] filed.., the
appellee is entitled to assume that the litigation is ended, and to act
on that assumption."
216
5. Limits of Mandamus
When a landowner has submitted a rezoning application or site
plan that complies with the requirements of a local ordinance, its
approval can be compelled through mandamus.211
In Umstattd v. Centex Homes, G.P., the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to
compel the town to accept a subdivision application because the
determination of whether to accept or reject such an application
is a discretionary function.218 In Umstattd, Centex Homes sought
to have a tract it owned rezoned to allow for more dense develop-
ment.219 In pursuit of that goal, Centex submitted an application
with a preliminary plat attached to town authorities as required
by the town ordinances.220 The town rejected the application be-
cause of deficiencies in the preliminary subdivision plat, includ-
ing the absence of deed book and tax map references, inadequate
information concerning street coordination, and breaches of the
town's Design and Construction Manual. 221 In response, Centex
filed a complaint in circuit court seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel the town to accept and process the application to final de-
222 ciucision. The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, and the
town appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 223
The supreme court reversed, holding that mandamus as a re-
medy is limited to the enforcement of ministerial duties-those
duties that an official must carry out without the exercise of dis-
cretion-alone. 224 Because the town officials in this case engaged
in "considerable investigation of the submitted plans.., and the
exercise of discretion and judgment in applying the applicable
statutes, ordinances and regulations," mandamus was inappro-
216. Id. at 345 n.3, 626 S.E.2d at 379 n.3 (citations omitted).
217. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-857 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
218. See 274 Va. 541, 546-48, 650 S.E.2d 527, 530-31 (2007).
219. Id. at 543, 650 S.E.2d at 529.
220. Id. at 543-44, 650 S.E.2d at 529.
221. Id. at 544, 650 S.E.2d at 529.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 545, 650 S.E.2d at 530.
224. Id. at 545-46, 650 S.E.2d at 530.
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priate. 22 It would seem, then, that a town's duty to act on an ap-
plication within a reasonable amount of time, for example, is
purely ministerial and thus subject to mandamus. 226 However,
here, the town officials acted in accordance with those time limi-
tations by rejecting the application promptly.2 7 Mandamus was
denied because Centex was not challenging the ministerial proce-
dures but the discretionary substance of the town's actions and
reasoning.228
6. Presence of a Quorum
Under Virginia law, a majority of the governing body's mem-
bers must be present to conduct a valid meeting. 229 Unless an ex-
ception to this quorum requirement is created by a separate, su-
pervening statute, a valid meeting of the governing body cannot
be conducted when a quorum is not present.20
In Jakabcin v. Town of Front Royal, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia resolved a question of first impression regarding the inter-
play of the traditional quorum requirements and the provisions of
the State and Local Government Conflict of Interests Act
("COIA") in the context of a regularly scheduled town council
meeting.2 31 Specifically, the court considered whether certain go-
verning body members could convene a valid meeting without a
quorum of its members present in order to meet its statutory
mandate to consider and act on certain rezoning and special use
permit applications. 212
The Front Royal Town Council was composed of six members,
and the town charter set a quorum at four members.233 Before the
council could approve and adopt any zoning ordinance or amend-
ment thereof, the council was required to hold at least one public
225. Id. at 546, 548, 650 S.E.2d at 530, 531.
226. Id. at 547, 650 S.E.2d at 531.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 547-48, 650 S.E.2d at 531.
229. "Unless otherwise specially provided, a governing body may exercise any of the
powers conferred upon it at any meeting of the governing body, regular, special or ad-
journed at which a quorum is present. A majority of the governing body shall constitute a
quorum...." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1415 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
230. Jakabcin v. Town of Front Royal, 271 Va. 660,666, 628 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2006).
231. See id. at 666-68, 628 S.E.2d at 322-23.
232. See id. at 663, 628 S.E.2d at 320.
233. Id. at 664, 628 S.E.2d at 320.
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hearing on the matter and convene two subsequent meetings to
conduct two readings and votes.234 At a duly noticed regular meet-
ing of council, only three members of the council met in an at-
tempt to convene a valid meeting to consider the town's busi-
ness.235 The agenda for the regular meeting featured many
different items of significance to the town for the council's consid-
eration and action, including the public hearing on the rezoning
and special use permit applications.238
Despite three members of the town council being absent and
over the objections of citizens in attendance, the remaining three
members determined that a regular meeting of the council could
be convened to consider and act upon the town's business.237 Two
of the absent councilmen determined their presence was not re-
quired because of their previously duly noted disqualifications
under the COIA.238 As to the third absent councilman, he was
simply absent by recusal.239 Nevertheless, the three members
present did convene the regular meeting, conducted the one re-
quired and only advertised public hearing on the rezoning and
special use permit applications, and considered and acted upon
all of the other unrelated items on the meeting agenda.240
At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Mayor scheduled a
subsequent special meeting of the council to conduct the first of
two required readings and votes on the applications. 24 1 The same
three members of the council then met for the first of two votes on
the rezoning and special use permit applications, which they ap-
proved. 242 At the second vote-meeting, the two COIA-citers
rejoined the council.243 One of the two left the room when the re-
zoning and special use applications came before the council, and
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2285 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006); FRONT ROYAL,
VA., CODE § 4-4 (Supp. 1995).
235. Jakabcin, 271 Va. at 664, 628 S.E.2d at 320-21.
236. See id. at 663-64, 628 S.E.2d at 320-21.
237. Id. at 664, 628 S.E.2d at 321.
238. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 320.
239. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 320-21.
240. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 321.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 665, 628 S.E.2d at 321.
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the second did not participate but "remained present.. . to avoid
further quorum problems."2"
Local residents filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment invalidating the town council's actions approving the
rezoning and special use permit applications for lack of the requi-
site quorum.245 The trial court rendered a bench ruling that the
COIA, particularly section 2.2-3112(C), reduces the required
number of governing members necessary to establish a quorum
sufficient to convene a regular meeting pursuant to Virginia Code
section 15.2-1415.246 The trial court concluded that COIA elimi-
nates the need for local officials to physically attend and be
counted for quorum requirements at regular and special meetings
when a conflict of interest disqualifies them from acting on a par-
ticular agenda item.241
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and invalidated the
application's approval. 248 In holding that the COIA did not super-
sede the traditional quorum requirements of section 15.2-1415,
the court opined:
In our system of representative government, the voters must of ne-
cessity rely on their elected legislative representatives to protect
their interests, to defend their freedoms, to advocate their views and
to keep them informed.
[Tihe physical presence of a majority of the members is necessary in
order that a valid meeting of a governing body may be convened and
that their continuing presence is necessary in order that the govern-
ing body may exercise the powers conferred upon it by law, except
that a number less than a quorum may adjourn the meeting to a lat-
er time. When a quorum is present, however, and members are dis-
qualified from acting on a particular matter pursuant to the provi-
sions of COIA, the remaining member or members may validly act
on the matter by majority vote.249
Thus, the way for a member of a local governing body to ensure
compliance with the requirements of the COLA while maintaining
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 669, 628 S.E.2d at 323.
249. Id. at 666-68, 628 S.E.2d at 322-23.
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a legal quorum to convene a valid meeting of the governing body
is to remain physically present but refuse to vote on the matter.
7. Petition for Referendum
A referendum is "an exercise by the voters of their traditional
right through direct legislation to override the views of their
elected representatives as to what serves the public interest."250
The referendum process amounts to a veto power over elected
representatives .251
In Committee of the Petitioners for Referendum ex rel. Kerry v.
City of Norfolk, the city passed four ordinances to allow only sin-
gle-family homes and townhouses to be constructed in the Ocean
View area of Norfolk.2 52 Many Norfolk residents opposed the
planned residential development of that property, and they de-
cided to utilize the referendum process to repeal the ordinances
by popular vote.2 53 The Norfolk City Charter allows residents to
submit a petition, with the requisite number of signatures, to the
circuit court for placement on a ballot and the setting of an elec-
tion date.2 54 Once the Norfolk residents secured the required sig-
natures and submitted their petition for referendum, the city and
housing authority intervened in circuit court and had the petition
invalidated because "it presented all four ordinances in a single
petition."1255
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and held
that separate petitions were not required to challenge each ordin-
ance.25 6 The court distinguished between the petition for referen-
dum and the referendum itself, stating that while the referendum
would need to address each of the four ordinances separately,
there is no similar requirement for the petition.2 57 Finding that
"the language of the Petition ... does not require the circuit court
250. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (quoting S.
Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
251. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Comm. for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 239 Va.
484, 489, 391 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1990) (quoting City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 673).
252. 274 Va. 69, 71-72, 645 S.E.2d 464, 465 (2007).
253. Id. at 72, 645 S.E.2d at 465.
254. NORFOLK, VA., CITY CHARTER §§ 35-36 (Supp. 2009).
255. Kerry, 274 Va. at 72, 645 S.E.2d at 465-66.
256. Id. at 74-75, 645 S.E.2d at 466-67.
257. Id. at 74, 645 S.E.2d at 467.
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to structure the ballot to require a single vote on the combined
ordinances," the court reversed and remanded the case to the cir-
cuit court to order the referendum.15 8
D. Zoning Flexibility Devices
1. The Nature of a Variance
Variances are defined as reasonable deviations from provisions
of a zoning ordinance which regulate the size or area of a parcel
or buildings thereon.2 59 Variances are generally granted to alle-
viate a particularized hardship arising from the strict enforce-
ment of zoning ordinances.260
In Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a variance pertaining to specific nonconforming
building features does not render the building in conformity for
other purposes of the ordinance. 261 The landowners in Goyonaga
owned a nonconforming structure on a nonconforming lot: the
width and area of the lot did not comply with local ordinances and
neither did the home's setback.2 62 The landowners sought an addi-
tion to the home and secured a variance to enlarge and extend the
home by adding a second story.263 The proposed addition would
not alter the nonconforming setback of the home, so the BZA ap-
proved the variance.264
Once construction had commenced, it became apparent that a
large portion of the home would need to be demolished. 265 Upon
the destruction of seventy-five percent of the home, the zoning
administrator issued a stop work order, directing that current
construction must cease and any new construction would need to
fully comport with all zoning provisions.2 6  She did so in reliance
258. Id. at 74-75, 645 S.E.2d at 467.
259. VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.2-2201 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
260. See id. § 15.2-2309 (Supp. 2009).
261. 275 Va. 232, 245, 657 S.E.2d 153, 160 (2008).
262. Id. at 236, 657 S.E.2d at 155.
263. Id. at 237, 657 S.E.2d at 155.
264. Id. This determination was in accord with a local ordinance providing that a struc-
tural addition to a nonconforming structure is permissible provided that "[n]o portion of
the addition would be closer to the front or side lot line than the existing structure." FALLS
CHURCH, VA., CODE § 38-6(c)(3) (Supp. 2007).
265. See Goyonaga, 275 Va. at 237-38, 657 S.E.2d at 156.
266. Id. at 238, 657 S.E.2d at 156.
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on a separate ordinance section that required any nonconforming
building that is removed, demolished, or destroyed to an extent
equal to seventy-five percent of its value to be discarded and elim-
inated the right of such nonconforming use to continue. 67 The
landowners challenged the application of that ordinance, assert-
ing that the variance they had obtained served to exempt them
from all aspects of the zoning ordinance, including the "seventy-
five-percent-destruction rule."268 They claimed that the variance
created a whole new set of zoning regulations specific to their
property.2 69
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the landowners'
argument and held that while the variance permitted the lan-
downers to build within the existing nonconforming setbacks, it
did not relieve them from other aspects of the local zoning ordin-
ance.2 70 The court reiterated prior law, stating "variances exist to
relieve . . . hardship resulting from strict application of zoning
provisions," not to carve out unlimited, property-specific zoning
regulations. 271
2. Additional Variances
In Horner v. Zoning Appeals Board, the circuit court ruled that
no additional variance is required when new construction is pro-
posed to be attached to an existing structure built pursuant to a
variance, so long as the new construction does not encroach upon
that portion of the existing structure which required the original
variance.2 72 The petitioners in Horner challenged their neighbors'
proposed home office addition to their existing garage. 273 Years be-
fore, the neighbors had been granted a variance to build the ga-
rage, which reduced the size of side yard setback from twelve feet
to five.274 Now they wanted to build a second story onto the garage
to be used as a home office, but they planned to maintain the
267. Id. at 236-37, 657 S.E.2d at 155.
268. Id. at 240-41, 657 S.E.2d at 157-58.
269. Id. at 241, 657 S.E.2d at 158.
270. Id. at 242, 657 S.E.2d at 158.
271. Id. at 241, 657 S.E.2d at 158 (quoting Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 261 Va. 407, 415, 544 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2001)).
272. 74 Va. Cir. 124, 129 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Fairfax County).
273. Id. at 126.
274. Id. at 125.
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twelve-foot setback for the second floor.275 The county zoning ad-
ministrator determined that because there was no further depar-
ture from the zoning ordinance (the required setback would be
observed for the new construction), no additional variance or
amendment was required.2 6 The petitioners challenged that deci-
sion to the BZA and, when that challenge failed, to the circuit
court.
27 7
Essentially, the petitioners argued that because the new con-
struction altered the dimensions and proposed use of the struc-
ture, it no longer complied with the variance.278 The circuit court
disagreed and affirmed the BZA's decision that "an amendment to
the variance was not required because the home office was to be
located on a portion of the [landowners'] property where they en-
joyed a by-right to build. ''279 The court stated that had the garage
owners sought to add the home office within that portion of their
property to which the original variance applied, it would have
reached a different result: "[Tihis Court would ... find that the
[property owners] were required to obtain an amendment to the
[original] variance."20 So, the circuit court concluded that addi-
tions or alterations to structures permitted by variances would be
allowed "provided the alterations or additions themselves con-
form to the [ordinance] requirements by not increasing the specif-
ic feature of the structure that required the variance. '281
3. Overlapping Setbacks
In Cherrystone Inlet, LLC v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia determined that overlapping setback re-
quirements did not interfere with all reasonable beneficial uses of
a waterfront property, so a variance was properly denied. 2 2 The
controversy arose when Cherrystone Inlet, LLC ("Cherrystone")
purchased five parcels of land located between a state highway
and the waters of the Cherrystone Inlet.283 At the time of pur-
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 125-26.
278. Id. at 126.
279. Id. at 130.
280. Id. at 130-31.
281. Id. at 131.
282. 271 Va. 670, 675, 628 S.E.2d 324, 326 (2006).
283. Id. at 672, 628 S.E.2d at 324-25.
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chase, Cherrystone knew that variances would be required for
residential construction because the property was subject to over-
lapping setbacks.2" On the waterfront side of the lots, the Chesa-
peake Bay Preservation Act (the "Bay Act")28 5 imposed a 110-foot
landward setback from the shoreline. 86 On the opposite side, a lo-
cal ordinance imposed a sixty-foot setback from the road.2 7 Since
most of the five lots had less than 170 feet between the road and
the shoreline and only one had sufficient space on which to build,
residential construction was largely impossible without setback
variances.2 8  Cherrystone was denied its variances by the zoning
administrator, the BZA, and the circuit court, and the Supreme
Court of Virginia granted certiorari. 28 9
Cherrystone argued that the setbacks subjected it to exception-
al hardship and interfered with all reasonable beneficial uses of
the property. 290 The court disagreed on both theories. It held that
relief by variance was, in this case, conditioned upon the re-
quirement that the lots be in existence on the effective dates of
the Bay Act and the local ordinance.291 Second, the court disa-
greed that the overlapping setbacks precluded all reasonable
beneficial use of the land: Cherrystone "could have treated the
[five lots] as a single ... parcel. A residential structure could have
been erected, as a matter of right, on that part of the parcel...
which is unaffected by overlapping setbacks, with the remaining
land used as a valuable waterfront amenity appurtenant to that
structure."292 Since the lots were not in existence as of the effec-
tive dates of the Bay Act and local ordinances, and at least one
beneficial use of the property remained, the court held that the
variances were properly denied.293
284. Id. at 672-73, 628 S.E.2d at 325.
285. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to 10.1-2115 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
286. Cherrystone Inlet, 271 Va. at 673, 628 S.E.2d at 325.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 673-74, 628 S.E.2d at 325-26.
290. Id. at 674-75, 628 S.E.2d at 326.
291. Id. at 674, 628 S.E.2d at 326.
292. Id. at 675, 628 S.E.2d at 326.
293. Id.
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III. LEGISLATION
The legislation passed in the 2008 and 2009 General Assembly
Sessions affects a wide variety of land use and zoning issues, from
development rights and conditional zoning to more modern
means of disseminating comprehensive plans. In addition, some
introduced legislation pertaining to these issues were either de-
feated outright or died in committee. Still others remain pending.
A summary of this legislation is below.
A. Passed Legislation: 2009
The conditional zoning process, encompassed in section 15.2-
2302, was amended by Senate Bill 1335 to allow local governing
bodies to waive the requirement for a public hearing when a prof-
feror has requested to amend the proffered conditions, but only if
the amendment does not affect use or density.294
Comprehensive plans, as governed by sections 15.2-2225, 15.2-
2226, and 15.2-2223.1, have also been affected. On March 27,
2009, the Governor approved Senate Bill 1064, which requires
that local planning commissions post any comprehensive plan
under consideration for recommendation on a publicly-available
website. 29- Once approved, the comprehensive plan-or any ap-
proved portion-must similarly be posted online.2 96 The plan must
be posted at both the planning commission stage and at the time
of its approval by the governing body.2 97 In addition, under Senate
Bill 1487, comprehensive plans that have required urban devel-
opment areas under section 15.2-2223.1 may now "provide for a
mix of residential housing types, including affordable housing, to
meet the projected family income distributions of future residen-
tial growth."298 House Bill 2322 further amended this requirement
to allow counties until July 1, 2011 to amend their comprehensive
294. S.B. 1335, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 315, 2009 Va. Acts _).
295. See S.B. 1064, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,
2009, ch. 605, 2009 Va. Acts _.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. S.B. 1487, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 327, 2009 Va. Acts __).
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plans in accordance with section 15.2-2223.1, and cities and
towns have until July 1, 2012 to do SO. 299
Through the passage of House Bill 1735, section 15.2-1129.1
has been amended to reflect that any locality, rather than those
on an enumerated list, may now create an arts and cultural dis-
trict within its boundaries "for the purpose of increasing aware-
ness and support for the arts and culture in the locality."00 The
Virginia Code section has retained its other provisions, including
the creation of tax incentives and the retention of regulatory flex-
ibility. °l
The passage of House Bill 2071 and Senate Bill 1033 have
amended section 15.2-2288.3 to recognize the agricultural nature
of licensed Virginia farm wineries, and places an additional re-
quirement on localities to acknowledge the agricultural nature of
activities and events at farm wineries when considering reasona-
ble restrictions on activities and events that are not usual and
customary for farm wineries. 02
This additional requirement adds to one of the most unique
code sections in Virginia land use law. Enacted in 2007, section
15.2-2288.3 represents a comprehensive restriction on a local
government's regulatory authority over farm wineries operating
in their locality. The law expressly prohibits a locality from regu-
lating multiple facets of a farm winery operation,30 3 and in the
context of activities and events at farm wineries, the law shifts
the burden of proof to localities to demonstrate that a particular
activity or event is not usual and customary for farm wineries
throughout the Commonwealth, and that the activity or event has
a "substantial impact" on the health, safety, or welfare of the pub-
lic, prior to any local regulation.34
The requirement that a locality must demonstrate a substan-
tial impact is apparently unique and appears nowhere else in
299. H.B. 2322, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 469, 2009 Va. Acts __).
300. H.B. 1735, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 30, 2009,
ch. 738, 2009 Va. Acts __).
301. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1129.1 (Supp. 2009).
302. See H.B. 2071, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27,
2009, ch. 416, 2009 Va. Acts __); S.B. 1033, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted
as Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 546, 2009 Va. Acts __).
303. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2288.3(E) (Supp. 2009).
304. See id. § 15.2-2288.3(A) (Supp. 2009).
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Virginia land use law. The requirement curtails a locality's gene-
ralized land use authority to enact regulations "to improve the
public health, safety, convenience and welfare of its citizens,"305
and places a considerably higher burden squarely on a locality
when attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness of its pro-
posed regulation of a farm winery's activities and events.
Other legislation reflects attention to "green" development of
sustainable fuels. House Bill 2165 has added section 15.2-
2288.01, which provides that localities may not require a special
use permit in order to allow the conversion of biomass-
agricultural-related materials such as vineyard, grain and crop
residues, and other materials-to alternative fuel on a small
scale, so long as at least fifty percent of the feedstock contributing
to the biomass is grown on site, the structure used to convert the
biomass is less than 4000 square feet in size, and the farm owner
notifies the locality's administrative head of the process.3 0 6 While
localities are permitted to make reasonable requirements for
hours of operation, noise, lot area, and setbacks, they may not be
more restrictive than they would be for other agricultural activi-
ties .301
While certain powers of localities have been curtailed, they
have now been provided the power to bill property owners for the
cost of correcting defacement-like graffiti--on private buildings
and structures after complying with notice requirements (in this
case, a minimum of fifteen days' notice prior to the removal of the
defacement).30 8 Unpaid charges constitute a lien on the property
that functions in the same way as unpaid local taxes.30 9
The General Assembly also reflected recognition of the impact
of recent economic factors on development. The bond requirement
for acceptance of a public right-of-way within a subdivision has
been reduced from twenty-five percent of the total estimated con-
struction cost to ten percent.310 Also, House Bill 207 created sec-
305. See id. § 15.2-2200 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
306. H.B. 2165, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 363, 2009 Va. Acts __).
307. Id.
308. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 319, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-908 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
309. Id.
310. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 193, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2241 (Supp. 2009)).
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tion 15.2-2209.1, titled "Extension of Approvals to Address Hous-
ing Crisis," which extends the validity of subdivision plats, rec-
orded plats, and final site plans outstanding as of January 1,
2009 until July 1, 2014. 111 Permits and plans associated with
those developments must similarly be extended.3 12 The new code
section also extends the validity of valid special exceptions, spe-
cial use permits, conditional use permits, and approved rezoning
actions outstanding as of July 1, 2009 to July 1, 2014 so long as
they are related to new residential or commercial development,
but only if they do not themselves contain a termination date or
time period limitation.3 13 In order for the extensions for plats, site
plans, and special exceptions to apply, performance bonds,
agreements, and other guarantees of public improvements asso-
ciated with the development must continue in full force.31 4
Expiration dates for special use permits outstanding as of Jan-
uary 1, 2009 have been extended to July 1, 2011 by passage of
Senate Bill 1533, which adds section 15.2-2288.4, regardless of
the operation of any statute, proffer, permit, local ordinance, or
local custom. 15 In noting this lack of limitation, this extension
goes further than that provided by the new section 15.2-2209.1.
The right to repair, rebuild, or replace a nonconforming resi-
dential or commercial building damaged by an act of God has
been further defined by House Bill 1680, which amends section
15.2-2307 to define the natural disasters or phenomena that qual-
ify as "acts of God" and also extends the act of God provision to
damage by accidental fire (though expressly omitting commission
of arson in an effort to secure vested rights).3 16
Vested rights are also implicated by the passage of Senate Bill
1524, which amends section 15.2-2286 to broaden the power of a
zoning administrator to determine whether rights have accrued
under subsection C of section 15.2-2311-which provides for ap-
311. H.B. 2077, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 196, 2009 Va. Acts __).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. S.B. 1533, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 636, 2009 Va. Acts __).
316. H.B. 1680, Va. Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch.
782, 2009 Va. Acts __).
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peals to the local board of zoning appeals-in addition to section15.2-2307 .17
In order to be valid under section 15.2-2308, as amended by
House Bill 1637, actions taken by BZAs must now be supported
by a majority vote of those members that are present and vot-
ing.318 In addition, BZAs have a new standard to follow in deter-
mining whether a variance can be granted. House Bill 2326 has
amended section 15.2-2309 to remove the requirement that a
property owner's "clearly demonstrable hardship" extend so far as
to "approach confiscation."319 BZAs must now only determine that
the "granting of [a] variance will alleviate a clearly demonstrable
hardship," but the bill continues to distinguish such a hardship
from a special privilege or convenience and retains the three-
prong undue hardship requirement.3 20
B. Passed Legislation: 2008
In 2008, Senate Bill 791 amended section 15.2-2201 to expand
the definition of "incentive zoning" to encompass not only features
and amenities, but also design elements, uses, services, ad de-
signs incorporating new urbanism, traditional neighborhood de-
velopment, environmentally sound and sustainable design, af-
fordable housing, and historical preservation.3 21
Section 15.2-2287.1 was added, and section 2.2-3100 amended,
by the passage of Senate Bill 532, which applies to Loudoun
County.322 This bill added section 15.2-2287.1 to those statutes
that are not superseded by the State and Local Government Con-
flicts of Interest Act, as members of the BOS, Planning Commis-
sion, and BZA in the County of Loudoun must now make a full
public disclosure of any current or recent (within 12 months)
business or financial interest prior to any hearing involving a
317. S.B. 1524, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 30, 2009,
ch. 721, 2009 Va. Acts __).
318. H.B. 1637, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 30, 2009,
ch. 734, 2009 Va. Acts _).
319. H.B. 2326, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009,
ch. 206, 2009 Va. Acts .
320. Id.
321. S.B. 791, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 12, 2008, ch.
635, 2008 Va. Acts 1024).
322. S.B. 532, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 2008, ch.
532, 2008 Va. Acts 785).
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special use permit, variance, or amendment to a zoning ordinance
map.3 23 The new statute defines "business or financial relation-
ship," describes the circumstances under which it applies, and
makes the knowing and willful failure to disclose a business or fi-
nancial interest a Class One misdemeanor.3 24
The approval of plats and the duration of plat validity as go-
verned by sections 15.2-2259, 15.2-2260, and 15.2-2261 have been
amended through House Bills 721 and 1177. House Bill 721 add-
ed considerable language to section 15.2-2259, which now in-
cludes two new subparts, (A)(2) and (A)(3).3 25 The first added sub-
part requires that, in localities with populations greater than
90,000 as of the 2000 Census, plat, site plan, and development
plan approval be governed by this statute in developments for
purely commercial real estate. 26 In such localities, a mandatory
sixty-day review period between the plan or plat's submission and
the time that it is either approved or disapproved has been im-
posed upon local planning commissions.3 27 The planning commis-
sion must also submit any portion of the plan that requires re-
view by a state agency to that agency within ten business days of
receiving the plan.32 8
Continuing these additions, it is also now incumbent on local
planning commissions reviewing the plan or plat to identify in
good faith all deficiencies to the greatest extent possible and to
describe those deficiencies with particularity (including refer-
ences to ordinances and statutes) when disapproving the plan or
plat.32 9 When the plan or plat is resubmitted after a prior disap-
proval, the planning commission is limited in its review to only
those deficiencies identified in the initial plan or plat review, and
new deficiencies cannot be identified.330 The second period of re-
view after an initial disapproval is limited to forty-five days; any
non-identified deficiencies of plans or plats not responded to with-
in forty-five days are deemed waived, and the plat or plan is
323. Id.
324. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2287.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
325. H.B. 721, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch.
855, 2008 Va. Acts 2246).
326. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2259(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
327. Id. § 15.2-2259(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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deemed approved."' However, where a non-corrected deficiency
would violate local, state, or federal law or mandatory Depart-
ment of Transportation or other engineering and safety require-
ments, the deficiency may continue to be considered. 332 Deficien-
cies not previously discovered due to omission, change, or errors
by the submitter are also open to consideration.333
Under section 15.2-2261, as amended by House Bill 1177, when
a final subdivision plat is approved and recorded that covers all
or a portion of a multiphase development, the underlying prelim-
inary plat is now valid for five years from the date of recording of
the latest plat.334 A recorded final subdivision plat for a portion of
property conveyed to a third party is now valid indefinitely unless
vacated by sections 15.2-2270 through 15.2-2278.335
In addition, House Bill 195 redefined and expanded the defini-
tion of "preliminary subdivision plat," "plat," and "plat of subdivi-
sion" to encompass not only the "schematic representation of land
divided or to be divided," but also information gathered in accor-
dance with sections 15.2-2241, 15.2-2242, 15.2-2258, 15.2-2262,
15.2-2264, and other applicable statutes. 36
With regard to the development of Urban Development Areas
as directed by the 2007 Session of the Virginia General Assembly
as part of its Transportation Financing Package, the 2008 Session
resolved, through Senate Joint Resolution 70 and House Joint
Resolution 178, that a joint subcommittee be established to com-
prehensively study development and land use tools to determine
if additional legislation is necessary to aid localities in the devel-
opment of Urban Development Areas.3 37
The fine for conviction of a violation of a zoning ordinance re-
lating to the total number of unrelated persons in a single-family
dwelling remains $2,000 under section 15.2-2286. 33 However, as
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. H.B. 1177, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 16, 2008,
ch. 426, 2008 Va. Acts 615).
335. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2270 to 15.2-2278 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
336. H.B. 195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008,
ch. 718, 2008 Va. Acts 1167).
337. See S.J. Res. 70, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); H.J. Res. 178, Va. Gen As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
338. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2286(A)(5) (Supp. 2009).
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amended by House Bill 1107, failure to correct the condition with-
in the specified time frame will result in a $5,000 fine (increased
from $2,000), and continued failure for each succeeding ten-day
period constitutes a separate misdemeanor and a potential fine of
$7,000 (increased from $5,000). 339 Jail terms for such violations
remain unavailable as a punishment.- ° In addition, under section
15.2-2286 as amended by House Bills 663 and 350, all zoning ad-
ministrators, rather than just those zoning administrators in Dis-
trict 8, are now authorized to ask the locality's attorney to file a
petition to enforce a zoning ordinance with regard to residence in
single-family housing by non-related persons.3'
Zoning administrators may also, under section 15.2-2286 as
amended by Senate Bill 428, present sworn testimony to a magi-
strate or court of competent jurisdiction in order to obtain an in-
spection warrant to enable entry of a building to determine if zon-
ing violations exist.142 Reasonable efforts to obtain consent of the
owner are required 34
Under section 15.2-2209, as amended by House Bill 679, when
civil penalties for violations of a zoning ordinance amount to
$5,000 or more, the violation can be pursued as a criminal mis-
demeanor244 In addition, upon admission or finding of liability for
a violation, unless good cause is shown, the court may order the
violator to abate or remedy the violation to comply with the or-
dinance within a time period determined by the court, but no
longer than six months .1 5 Each day during which the violation
continues to exist after that period has ended constitutes a sepa-
rate offense.3 46
House Bill 190 and Senate Bill 230 amended section 15.2-2244
to count stepchildren as "family members" in order to make them
339. H.B. 1107, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 12, 2008,
ch. 593, 2008 Va. Acts 884).
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2286(A)(5) (Supp. 2009).
341. H.B. 350, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 12, 2008,
ch. 581, 2008 Va. Acts 857); H.B. 663, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act
of Mar. 4, 2008, ch. 297, 2008 Va. Acts 442).
342. S.B. 428, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 4, 2008, ch.
343, 2008 Va. Acts 504).
343. Id.
344. H.B. 679, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008,
ch. 727, 2008 Va. Acts 1292).
345. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2209 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
346. Id.
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subject to this code section, which governs the subdivision of a lot
for conveyance to a family member.3'
House Bill 1078 amended section 15.2-2307 to govern vested
rights with regard to building permits and payment of taxes.48
While zoning ordinances may continue to require nonconforming
structures to conform to regulations when the structure is en-
larged, the statute now invokes the Uniform Statewide Building
Code in defining whether the structure has been "structurally al-
tered" and adds that zoning ordinances may provide that no non-
conforming use (as opposed to just a nonconforming structure or
building) may be expanded (or that the structure may not be
moved, as provided in the previous version of the statute).3 49 De-
tailed language has been added by the bill to provide that, when a
building has been completed in accordance with a building permit
and a certificate of occupancy has been issued or when the owner
of a nonconforming structure has paid local taxes for more than
fifteen years, the zoning ordinance is not permitted to define the
structure as illegal or to require its removal solely due to its non-
conformity.350
Section 15.2-2307 was also amended by Senate Bill 393, which
now allows the owner of a residential or commercial building that
is otherwise nonconforming to repair, rebuild, or replace it after a
natural disaster or other act of God.3 51 During the 2009 Session,
the term "act of God" was expressly defined in the statute.35 2
In situations where a variance permits a structure, section
15.2-2309 has been amended by House Bill 1079 to provide that
the structure may not be expanded unless it is within the same
site area or portion of the structure where a variance is not re-
quired.353 If it is within an area or portion of the site where a
347. H.B. 190, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008,
ch. 717, 2008 Va. Acts 1167); S.B. 230, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as
Act of Mar. 4, 2008, ch. 340, 2008 Va. Acts 502).
348. H.B. 1078, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 2008,
ch. 377, 2008 Va. Acts 552).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. S.B. 393, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 2008, ch.
411, 2008 Va. Acts 596).
352. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
353. H.B. 1079, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 4, 2008,
ch. 318, 2008 Va. Acts 481).
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variance is required, then an additional variance must be applied
for.
354
Section 15.2-2303 was amended by House Bill 1084, which pro-
vides that, when a locality that has accepted proffers which in-
clude pedestrian improvements, the Virginia Department of
Transportation shall allow construction of those improvements so
long as the Department did not object to the improvement during
rezoning and so long as the improvement does not violate local,
state, or federal laws, regulations, or required engineering and
safety standards. 3
House Bill 1086 amended section 15.2-2311 to specify that no-
tice of the thirty-day period for appeals to the BZA must be in-
cluded in the order of a zoning administrator or notice of zoning
violation and must be sent via registered or certified mail to, or
posted at, the last known address of the property owner as re-
flected by tax assessment records.156 Importantly, the thirty-day
appeal period may now be shortened to no less than ten days un-
der section 15.2-2286 as amended by House Bill 1061, not only in
situations involving temporary or seasonal commercial uses or
parking of commercial trucks in residential zoning districts (as
under the previous versions of the statute), but, in addition, with
regard to violations of maximum occupancy limitations of a resi-
dential dwelling unit or similar short-term, recurring violations.157
Zoning administrators may also now record a memorandum of
lis pendens to enforce zoning ordinances through section 15.2-
2208 as amended by House Bill 466.358 The memorandum is re-
quired to expire after 180 days, under both section 15.2-2208 and
section 8.01-268 as amended by House Bill 80 and Senate Bill
427 . 359 The memorandum still continues if the owner of the pro-
354. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309 (Supp. 2009).
355. H.B. 1084, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008,
ch. 733, 2008 Va. Acts 1296).
356. H.B. 1086, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 2008,
ch. 378, 2008 Va. Acts 553).
357. See H.B. 1061, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 14,
2008, ch. 317, 2008 Va. Acts 479).
358. H.B. 466, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 12, 2008,
ch. 583, 2008 Va. Acts 859).
359. Id.; H.B. 80, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 2008,
ch. 60, 2008 Va. Acts 60); S.B. 427, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of
Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 204, 2008 Va. Acts 301).
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perty transfers it to another entity, but only if the transferor
holds an ownership interest in the entity of greater than fifty per-
cent.3
60
IV. CONCLUSION
Gertude Stein once wrote: "In the United States there is more
space where nobody is than where anybody is. That is what
makes America what it is."361 As we carry on in the new millen-
nium, that assessment continues to lose veracity; and, looking
forward, reasonable planning and zoning-along with a balanced
respect for private property interests-will be a touchstone to the
success of the Old Dominion.
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2208 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009).
361. GERTRUDE STEIN, THE GEOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA OR THE RELATION OF
HuMAN NATURE TO THE HUMAN MIND (1936), reprinted in GERTRUDE STEIN: WRITINGS
1932-1946, at 367 (Catharine R. Stimpson & Harriet Chessman eds., 1998).
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